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THE IMPOSING SPECTER OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
FOR EXCLUSIVE PROMOTION OF GREEN BUILDING
CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS
Colin W. Maguire
I. INTRODUCTION
"Green buildings" is a catchphrase many Americans hear in their
everyday lives. The popular discussion of environmentally sound
building practices and their implementation in projects is beyond jus-
tified; it is essential. Approximately ninety percent of all raw materials
taken from the environment are used for building projects.' In addi-
tion, the energy it takes to construct and operate buildings far out-
paces any other man-made source and contributes to high carbon
dioxide emissions.' How municipalities address this growing concern
varies by community.' Concerns about enforcing building codes can
put financial stress on local developers.' Similarly, different types of
municipalities may have different types of building concerns:
Typically, developers choose locations for specific, economic-
driven reasons. A building located in San Francisco will likely
be more expensive to permit and erect than a building con-
structed in Bowling Green, Kentucky. However, the building
in San Francisco will also be able to take in higher rents, will
likely have a higher occupancy rate, and will be situated in a
location that provides access to numerous public parks,
transit, and cosmopolitan and business opportunities. This
illustrates the importance that locality plays when a devel-
oper is making a decision about which market to enter.
It would be a laudable goal for every municipality to create their
own, independent green building standard. However, factors such as
severe budget cuts, a lack of knowledge, and the very economic factors
alluded to above can direct municipalities to the LEED@ (Leadership
1. Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry's LEED@: Municipal Adoption of Private
Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REv. 285, 288 (2010) (citing Charles K.
Kibert, Green Building: An Overview of Progress,19 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L.
491, 493 (2004)).
2. Id. at 288 (citing U.S. Dept. of Energy, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY, 2008 Buildings Energy Data Book 1-3 (2008), available at http://
buildingsdatabook.eren.doe.gov/docs/DataBooks/2008-BEDB.pdf).
3. Id. at 301-02.
4. Id. at 329-30.
5. Schindler, supra note 1, at 302.
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in Energy and Environmental Design) standard due to name recogni-
tion and other market forces.'
The Environmental Protection Agency defines the practice of green
building as "the practice of creating structures and using processes
that are environmentally responsible and resource-efficient through-
out a building's life-cycle from siting to design, construction, opera-
tion, maintenance, renovation, and deconstruction. This practice
expands and complements the classical building design concerns of
economy, utility, durability, and comfort."' LEED@ is a designation
created by the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) which
seeks to promote green building practices.' The growth of LEED@
and the USGBC has been both a national and international phenome-
non, creating an entire marketplace of green building certifications
and boasting a network of over 13,000 members in a little over a dec-
ade.' A LEED@ certified building falls into one of three categories:
LEED@ Silver, LEED@ Gold, and LEED@ Platinum."o These designa-
tions assess a building's sustainable features as they relate to the cate-
gories of "(1) site planning; (2) water management; (3) energy
management; (4) material use; (5) indoor environmental air quality;
and (6) innovation & design progress.""
Contrary to the beliefs of some, this is not a governmental organiza-
tion.' 2 Rather, USGBC is a 501(c) (3) non-profit organization with its
offices based in Washington, D.C.; they also have a sort of "federal"
looking seal as their emblem.'" Therefore, the confusion is somewhat
understandable. The LEED@ designation extends to buildings, as well
as organizations and professionals through the LEED@ AP program.14
There is little misunderstanding that LEED® is the pioneering stan-
dard in the green building industry." The standard's name is popular
and known, as a friend recently remarked to me, "Isn't LEED@ like
the Kleenex@ of green building certifications?" This does appear to
be the case to many, but those in the green building industry under-
stand that the situation is changing.'"
6. Schindler, supra note 1, at 303-04.
7. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/greenbuilding/
pubs/about.htm (last visited Mar. 03, 2012).
8. USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
9. Les Lo Baugh, LEED@ Green Building Incentives, 556 PLI/REAL 23, 25
(2008).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. USBGC, http://www.usgbc.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
13. Id.
14. USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CategorylD=19 (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2012).
15. See Sherry Bonelli, LEED Isn't the Only Green Building Certification in Town,
SUCCEED AT LEED (Oct. 23, 2011), http://succeedatleed.com/?p=583
[hereinafter Bonelli].
16. See Bonelli, supra note 15.
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LEED® faces increasingly stiff competition in the green building
certification market." Most notable among their competitors is Green
Globes@, a building rating system that prides itself on flexibility and a
streamlined administrative process." Though originally operating ex-
clusively in Canada, Green Globes@ now has certified buildings
throughout North America." Green Homes@ America is a green au-
diting and improvement service specializing in residential proper-
ties.20 Even ENERGY STAR, a U.S. Government energy-efficiency
assessment process,2 1 will now certify buildings as energy efficient and
can boast over 15,000 certified buildings.2 2 There are other smaller,
regional certifications such as the one I have worked with: the Society
of Environmentally Responsible Facilities@ (SERF).
To fully disclose my position, I have worked for, and continue to
contract with, a developing green building certification system based
in East Lansing, Michigan. SERF@ is a low-cost, customer service-
based, marketing-driven certification created by property owners for
property owners.2 1 While working at this company, my co-workers and
I began to question the validity of municipalities exclusively promot-
ing LEED@. As we found out in our communications with others in
the green industry, our confusion was shared. Still, this confusion
never manifested itself into any kind of research or exploration.
Rather, there was a general feeling that this just did not seem right.
Fortuitously enough, events transpired that compelled me to dig
deeper.
Recently, I had the honor of being appointed to the City of Lan-
sing's Planning Board.24 As part of our duties, we began assessing a
proposed draft of the 2011 City Master Plan (Plan), which would ulti-
mately be presented to the public with our suggestions. I was not sur-
prised when several sections of the Plan referenced LEED@ or that
projects following the LEED@ standard would receive beneficial treat-
ment in terms of their zoning and permit processes. However, I was as
confused as ever and infinitely more concerned. Why would my own
city do this? Were they not aware of alternatives? Was this even legal?
This last question was particularly relevant because it meant the City,
17. See Bonelli, supra note 15.
18. Why Green Globes is Better, GREEN GLOBES, http://www.greenglobes.com/
about-why.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
19. What is Green Globes?, GREEN GLOBES, http://www.greenglobes.com/about.
asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
20. Id.
21. About Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab
index (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
22. Id.
23. SOCIETY OF ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE FACILITIES, www.serfgreen.org/
about us/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
24. Colin W. Maguire, CV (Mar. 3, 2012) (on file with the University of Balti-
more School of LawJournal of Land and Development).
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already in financial distress, could be opening itself up to costly litiga-
tion from other green building certification systems.
This issue was suddenly one of great importance to me personally
and professionally. The pressing question was this: Could the City of
Lansing be held liable in a state anti-trust lawsuit, and any federal
claims, for exclusively promoting and rewarding those green building
projects which use the LEED® certification standard? I did an initial
report, which I presented to my fellow board members." The initial
research revealed the topic was broader than I had imagined-there
was a significant state antitrust issue and other federal issues. Indeed,
this question was not merely one for Lansing but for every municipal-
ity in Michigan and municipalities in other states. As a result of my
extensive research, I came to the following conclusions.
The purpose of this article is not to propagate backlash against
LEED@, but only to propagate backlash against the exclusive promo-
tion of green building certification systems (including Green Globes@
or others) by municipalities. The USGBC itself admits that the green
building standard industry had a projected value of around $60 bil-
lion in 2010.26 Still, municipalities across the country seem cavalier in
their attitudes toward using a private product as a harsh property re-
striction.27 The purpose of my analysis is not to definitively prove that
a potential lawsuit against a municipality would ultimately be success-
ful. Instead, the point is to prove that a plausible case exists.2 ' Even a
lawsuit that is ultimately dismissed or settled can be extremely costly
and draining to the defending party. I hope this article will enlighten
municipal leaders and save them from avoidable trouble.
II. THERE EXISTS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT A STATE LAW
ANTI-TRUST SUIT COULD SUCCEED AGAINST A MUNICI-
PALITY THAT ENDORSES THE LEED@ STANDARD OR ANY
OTHER GREEN BUILDING STANDARDS, EITHER EXCLU-
SIVELY OR ON AN EXCLUSIVE LIST.
The first direct challenge to a LEED@ requirement in a municipal
code appears to have been litigated in Air Conditioning, Heating, and
Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque, a 2008 case from the U.S. Dis-
trict Court in New Mexico.29 In that case, a group representing house-
hold appliance makers sued the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico,
25. Id.
26. Sarah Fox, A Climate Change: Shifting Environmental Concerns and Property Law
Norms Through the Lens of LEED Building Standards, 28 VA. E NvrL. L J. 299,
301 (2010); USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CategorylD
=1 (last visited Feb. 19, 2010). [hereinafter Fox].
27. Id.
28. To give the analysis focus, only Michigan statutes will be analyzed for their
relevance on the issue of state anti-trust suits.
29. The Air Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquer-
que, 2008 WL 5586316, at *2 (D. N.M. 2008).
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for creating a city-wide requirement that buildings should include ap-
pliances that qualified under certain LEED@ standards for energy-effi-
ciency.so The U.S. District Court granted the plaintiffs request for
injunction against the City's enforcement of their code, reasoning
that the manufacturers would suffer economic injury from having to
adjust their stock, would be unable to sell certain products, and would
be unable to fully help their customer."' The court also reasoned that
the injunction was needed immediately because in the specific case of
New Mexico state law, it was unclear that the manufacturers would be
able to pierce the doctrine of state immunity."
The issue of LEED@ exclusivity in a municipal code as being an
anti-trust issue has been previously considered an impending threat
for municipalities across the country." LEED@ has gone so far as to
publicize and extol the value of making LEED@ the law.3 4 If un-
checked, the propagation of LEED@ as law lends itself to a simple,
causal conclusion: LEED@ will sustain its dominance no matter what
competitive measures other companies engage in." The problem of
LEED@ dominance is very real, with LEED@-based state programs in
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawai'i, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, plus innumerable municipal ef-
forts of a similar nature, thus the temptation to cross legal lines is
prevalent." Still, the question remains (and it is a good one) of
whether a state anti-trust claim against a municipality exclusively
adopting LEED@ could be successful?" Although state law may differ
greatly on this issue," let us examine specifically whether such a claim
could proceed in the state of Michigan.
A. Government Immunity Exceptions Can Be Vague in a Broad Sense and
May Require Claim Specificity.
Generally, government entities are immune from tort liability.39
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §691.1407 provides notable ex-
30. Id.
31. Id. at *5.
32. Id.
33. Fox, supra note 26.
34. Id.; see also Public Policies Adopting or Referencing LEED, U.S. GREEN BUILDING
COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPagelD=1852fed-
eral (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
35. Fox, supra note 26.
36. Les Lo Baugh, supra note 9.
37. Les Lo Baugh, supra note 9.
38. Les Lo Baugh, supra note 9.
39. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §691.1407 (West, 2011 Legis. Sess).
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ceptions to this doctrine.4 0 Both sections (1) and (2) offer largely in-
dependent standards for exceptions to governmental immunity but
share one controlling idea: government function.4 1 What a legitimate
government function entails is the key, though admittedly broad, is-
sue in government tort liability; as such, it tends to be tort specific.4 2
For instance, if you sued a government for injury sustained in a gov-
ernment-owned building due to a government agency's negligence,
then you would have to establish that the building was used for a gov-
ernment function.4 3 However, that analysis of government function
would differ substantially from an analysis of unfair business prac-
tices.4 4 In the public building example, you would need to prove the
building was used for a government function to move forward with a
tort claim."5 In terms of anti-trust issues, a tort claim at any state level
may only proceed if the action in question was not a government
function.4 6
So, would the exclusive promotion of LEED@ as a green building
certification fall within the scope of the City's authority? This question
is best answered by looking at current anti-trust law in Michigan and
its standard for government function.
B. State Anti-trust Law Gives Clearer, Contextual Guidance to What a
"Government Function" Is.
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §445.773 defines monopoliz-
ing activity as "[t] he establishment, maintenance, or use of a monop-
oly, or any attempt to establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in a
relevant market by any person, for the purpose of excluding or limit-
ing competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices, is unlaw-
ful."4 7 The green building market has become a relevant market with
various competing interests.48 Though LEED® is certainly the pio-
neer of the market, they face stiff competition from organizations like
Green Globes@, ENERGY STAR, Green Homes@ America, and other
more regional building certification organizations.4 9
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Swartz Ambulance Serv. v. Genesee County, 666 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728 (E.D.
Mich. 2009).
43. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §691.1406 (West 2011).
44. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Detroit, 616 F.Supp. 162 (government function in injury
case); Swartz Ambulance Sew., 666 F.Supp. 2d 721 (government function
analysis in unfair business practice case).
45. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
46. Id.
47. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.773 (West 2011).
48. Les Lo Baugh, supra note 9.
49. See Brian Clark Howard, 10,000 Certified Buildings Later LED Aim for Market
Transformation, EcOMAGINATION (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.ecomagina-
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Mandating that buildings be LEED@ compliant or certified to re-
ceive administrative advantages is similar to saying the City will give
administrative advantages to those building projects which use Glid-
den@ paint as opposed to Sherwin-Williams@ or Behr@ brand. In
other words, it is a logical case for violation of state anti-trust law.
However, the Michigan statute does offer some insulation to govern-
ment entities even when government activity appears monopolistic in
nature and specifically provides a standard for government function.o
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §445.774 provides exceptions
to anti-trust violation liability for government entities in stating: "This
act shall not be construed to prohibit, invalidate, or make unlawful
any act or conduct of any unit of government, when the unit of gov-
ernment is acting in a subject matter area in which it is authorized by
law to act. .. ."5 This is the important section because it speaks di-
rectly to what standard should be used to establish a government func-
tion: a state statute that expressly or implicitly authorizes that
function.5 ' Therefore, if a state law is in place that requires a govern-
ment entity to interact with private businesses in a certain way, then
monopoly situations may be unavoidable and should be allowed with-
out fear of lawsuits.
C. Recent Cases on This Subject Strongly Establish That a Legitimate Gov-
ernment Function Exception Requires a State Statute That Explicitly or
Implicitly Supports This Activity.
Similar issues have recently been litigated in Michigan. In Patriot
Ambulance Serv. Inc., v. Genesee County,53 a 2009 decision, the court rea-
soned that the state of Michigan gave Genesee County the ability to
provide and regulate ambulance services as per Michigan Compiled
Laws §§ 333.20902(5), 333.20908(6), which defines ambulance opera-
tions to include patient transport, and a patient to include a nonemer-
gency patient,54 so it was not a violation of federal or state anti-trust
law to pick two companies to provide this service. In Miranda v. Michi-
gan," a 2001 decision, the court reasoned that Michigan Compiled
Laws § 791.206(1) (D)1 6 implicitly allowed the Michigan Department
of Corrections to have one collect-call service provider for its inmates
because the statute gave the Department of Corrections the authority
tion.com/ten-thousand-certified-buildings-later-leed-aims-for-market-
transformation.
50. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.773 (West 2011).
51. Id. at §445.774.
52. See id.
53. Patriot Ambulance Serv. Inc., v. Genesee Co., 666 F.Supp.2d 712, 718 (E.D.
Mich. 2009).
54. See id. at 718-19.
55. Miranda v. Michigan, 168 F.Supp.2d 685, 692 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
56. Id.
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"regarding the management and control of state penal institutions."5 7
This appears to be good news for the Michigan municipalities that
exclusively promote green building certifications, but further research
reveals a major flaw in that conclusion: Michigan has no green build-
581ing statute.
D. Michigan Has No Controlling Statute of Green Building Promotion but
Illinois Has a Model Example.
Michigan has no state statutes that govern the promotion, planning,
or construction of certified green buildings." This makes a great deal
of sense as the sale of many luxury products and services are not some-
how regulated by the state."o If a green building certification is not a
luxury item, which may be a prevailing opinion since more and more
municipal codes are referencing them, then obtaining such certifica-
tions must be an open and non-exclusive process. There is a strong
reason to believe that promoting and rewarding a single green build-
ing certification is not acting within the scope of government author-
ity because it is completely unsupported by statute.
The one state statute that may lend support to the promotion of
green building certifications is Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated
§125.1504,1 which is part of the Stille-Derossett-Hale Single State
Construction Code Act.6 2 This act deals with the promulgation, con-
tents, and updates of a state construction code." Particularly relevant
is §125.1504(3), which promotes the recognition of national stan-
dards for construction materials, the creation of optimal standards,
the use of modern technologies for the general welfare, the standards
for energy-efficiency, and the continual review of energy-efficiency
standards." Read together, these goals could be seen as the implicit
promotion of a green building code. The statute has direct refer-
ences to modern building materials and energy efficiency; it refer-
ences the same components that help make up a green building
standard. 5 That does not necessarily mean that the statute expressly
promotes private standards, though the implication could be made
that the state statute should look to building material standards "con-
sistent with nationally recognized standards." 6 This is an implicit indi-
57. Miranda, 168 F.Supp.2d at 691.
58. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 125.1504 (West 2006); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
3125 (West 2008).
59. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §125.1504 (West 2006).
60. Barto v. United States, 823 F.Supp. 1369, 1369 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
61. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.1504 (West 2006).
62. Id. § 125.1501.
63. Id.
64. Id. at §125.1504(3).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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cation that private green building standards may be considered."
However, in no way would this state statute explicitly or implicitly indi-
cate that one private standard could be exclusively promoted. Con-
versely, the standard is broad and looks to affect positive changes in
building practices that affect the general welfare. Still, why should
Michigan municipalities be forced to enter into this type of analysis
when a model state statute exists in Illinois that also addresses the
growing nature of the green building market?69
In July of 2009, Illinois passed the Green Buildings Act.70 This stat-
ute stated that "[a] 11 new State-funded building construction and ma-
jor renovations of existing State-owned facilities are required to seek
LEED, Green Globes, or equivalent certification."" This non-exclu-
sive statutory requirement allows a variety of green building certifica-
tions to be considered by publicly funded construction projects.7 ' The
implication could be made, if Michigan had the same statute, that
promoting green building certifications is a government function.
There could be an implicit, logical progression to a municipality's
promoting of a non-exclusive list of certification for use in private
building projects. Illinois' Green Building Statute also seeks to keep
pace with the market by stating that "[t] he green building standards
contained in this Act shall be analyzed and evaluated by the [b] oard 5
years after the effective date of this Act. . . .
North Carolina has also enacted a green building statute similar to
Illinois' that explicitly allows counties to reduce building permit fees
or provide different subsidies to buildings that comply with LEED@ ,
Green Globes@, or " [a] certification or rating by another nationally
recognized certification or rating system that is equivalent or greater
than [LEED® or Green Globes@ ]."" The possibility of anti-trust vio-
lations as a result of municipal involvement with green building certi-
fications has also been recently addressed in New York."
In the Empire State, the potential anti-competitive consequences of
adopting the LEED@ standard as law have been explored in addition
to the possibility that such action would establish a clear preference
shown to LEED@ while delegating code compliance authority to a pri-
vate third party." After all, a LEED® AP would have to establish
LEED@ certification and then submit such findings to municipal offi-
67. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.1504(3) (West 2011).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 20 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 3130/1 (West 2011).
71. Id. at 3130/15(a).
72. See id. at 3130/15(b).
73. Id. at 3130/15(g).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §153A-340(h)(i) (West 2011).
75. PATRICIA E. SALKIN, N.Y. ZONING LAw & PRACTICE §32A:28 (3d ed. 2011).
76. Id.
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cials." Similar to Michigan law, New York law would not likely immu-
nize a municipality from a state anti-trust lawsuit." The suggested
solution is also simple: provide a non-exclusive list of acceptable
certifications.7
As it stands, even if the Illinois or North Carolina statutes existed in
Michigan, Michigan municipalities exclusively using the LEED® stan-
dard would not be viable as acting within a government function be-
cause such a statue would show Michigan municipalities that they may:
(1) expressly authorize a non-exclusive promotion of a green building
certifications for funding purposes; (2) .impliedly authorize a non-ex-
clusive promotion of green building certifications for other purposes,
like zoning fast-tracking; and (3) not even implicate an exclusive pro-
motion of a green building certification. Furthermore, a similar stat-
ute to Illinois' would compel authorities at the state level to
reconsider the green building certification market on a regular
schedule.
E. Federal Law Supports a State Claim by Looking More to a Marketplace
Analysis and Has a Similar Standard for Government Function; Though
a Federal Anti-trust Suit Would Not Be Possible.
The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that local governments may cre-
ate anti-competitive requirements if they have a supporting state stat-
ute and there exists a "clear articulation of a state policy" with a
"foreseeable result."o In the case of an exclusive green building certi-
fication system, the municipality would likely know that the foresee-
able result of exclusively promoting a certification system like LEED@
would be that other certification systems would be at a competitive
disadvantage."
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §445.784 considers how Michi-
gan antitrust law should be viewed in a broader sense. It cites the
importance of outside sources that may be more developed in anti-
trust law; specifically, it cites federal anti-trust analysis." Not all anti-
trust issues involve government promotion of a product.8 4 Still, many
77. Id.
78. Id.; Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Vill. of Lynbrook, 293 A.D.2d 537, 538 (N.Y.
2002) (no municipal immunity under the Donnelly Act); Atl.-Inland, Inc. v.
Town of Union, 483 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (striking ordinance
where third party had sole right to conduct inspections).
79. SAUN, supra note 75.
80. BRIAN W. BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AvOIDING INVITA-
TIONS To ABUSE DISCRETION §8:80 (2011); City of Columbia v. Omni Out-
door Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372 (1991); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985).
81. BIAESSER, supra note 80; Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 373.
82. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §445.784 (West 2012).
83. Id. at MICH. §445.773.
84. See generally Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986) (showing anti-trust lawsuit brought by American manufacturing
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of the market concerns one might consider when two large cable
providers wish to merge are similarly present when governments be-
come proactive in a marketplace. As Federal Trade Commissioner
William E. Kovacic noted as recently as December 2010,
"[m]onopolies that owe their power to government regulation pro-
vide none of the dynamic benefits that flow from business rivalry and
impose significant costs in the form of higher prices and lower qual-
ity."" Perhaps not surprisingly given the cases reviewed above, federal
courts are required to let state-level monopolistic activity stand if the
activity is truly a state action; this is also called "state action doc-
trine."" This should sound strikingly familiar to the state anti-trust/
monopoly analysis.
However, it would not be possible to initiate a federal anti-trust suit
against a Michigan municipality as hypothesized here. This is because
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act specifically states that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with a for-
eign nation, is declared to be illegal."" The operative barrier here is
that Michigan municipalities would only be trying to control com-
merce within the state, not between states." Still, it would be impor-
tant for the plaintiffs in a case like this to get the case to federal court
and possibly succeed on federal claims.
III. WHETHER A STATE ANTI-TRUST CLAIM IS SUCCESSFUL,
CLAIMANTS COULD GAIN AN ADVANTAGE BY SUING IN
FEDERAL COURT BY JOINING THEIR STATE ANTI-TRUST
CLAIM WITH AN EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE CLAIM
AND A DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CLAIM, BOTH OF
WHICH HAVE A PLAUSIBLE BASIS FOR SUCCEEDING.
In drafting a pleading under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 8(a), we would expect to see the same or similar fact in a
pleading for a state claim or a federal claim arising from the same
cause of action" (which would inherently require a pleading to be
companies against Japanese electronics manufacturers for alleged conspir-
acy to drive out American companies from the television manufacturing
market); United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (showing
the United States brought civil action against automobile dealers alleging
that automobile dealers were engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade).
85. WILLIAM E. KovAcIc, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF ADVISORY OPINION/
COMMENT LETTER, 2010 WL 5158210 at 2 (Dec. 7, 2010).
86. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International
Competition Norms: Anti-Trust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U.
L. REv. 1555, 1568 (2010).
87. 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (West 2004).
88. See infra Sub. Sec. B.
89. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 10(b). Cf Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Miller, 781 F.
Supp. 1271, 1278 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1324 (3d ed. 2011)) (deny-
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filed against an individual municipal official). Also, in following FRCP
18(a), it makes sense to join the state and federal claims."0 The com-
bined claims will then necessarily have "federal question" subject mat-
ter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §1331." The claims would
probably be brought in federal court in the state where the municipal-
ity is located."
The claimant would have the tactical advantage of bringing suit in
federal court, where the judge would likely be more open to the
claims than a local state judge." Admittedly, the challenge for the
claimant would be proving causation and damages. As such, munici-
palities should anticipate filing a FRCP 12(b) (6) motion for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." They should also
anticipate filing a FRCP 12(b) (7)9" motion for failing to join USGBC
pursuant to FRCP 19(a)." The result of this last motion would be
difficult to predict. Jurisdiction would not be an issue, but there is an
argument that you would need to join USGBC (despite not having a
direct claim against them in this scenario) because their interest could
be impaired or impeded if they were notjoined." This would require
a decision on the part of the judge as to whether defending their pos-
sibly illegal exclusivity, which USGBC may or may not have specifically
sought, is critical to USGBC's interest." In any event, this is not the
ing defendant's contention that the plaintiff may not plead a combined
federal and state cause of action).
90. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) cmt. 1966 amendment (the 1966 amendments
promote the joinder of claims).
91. 28 U.S.C.A. §§1331, 1367(a) (West 1980) (Showing that the court will have
original jurisdiction pursuant to the former section for the federal question
claim, and thus supplemental jurisdiction under the latter for the non-fed-
eral question claim). This type of supplemental jurisdiction would specifi-
cally be pendant jurisdiction. Victors v. Kronmiller, 553 F. Supp. 2d 533,
553-54 (D. Md. 2008) (quoting Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007) (quot-
ing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))) ("Pendant
jurisdiction may be exercised when federal and state claims have a 'com-
mon nucleus of operative fact' and would 'ordinarily be expected to be
tried all in one judicial proceeding."') (internal quotation marks in
original).
92. The federal court in the state would have in personam jurisdiction over the
municipality in the state in which it is located, unless the municipality had
minimum contacts elsewhere. Cf WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 89, at
§1067 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington State, 326 U.S. 310 (1945))
(describing the modern notions of in personam jurisdiction after the pre-
eminent International Shoe case and its descendents). Venue would there-
fore be proper in the state of the municipality. 28 U.S.C.A. §1391 (West
2011).
93. Cf Peter E. Halle, The Elements of a Federal Antitrust Violation §67:44 (3d
ed. 2011) (stating that there are some legal and tactical reasons for the
plaintiff to seek pendant (supplemental) jurisdiction in antitrust cases).
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
95. See id. at 12(b)(7).
96. See id. at 19(a).
97. See id. at 19(a) (1) (B) (i).
98. See id.
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type of position Michigan municipalities would want to find them-
selves in. However, the claimant would have to come up with a re-
motely viable federal claim to even get the case to federal court under
28 U.S.C.A. §1331." The claimant could look to the Equal Protection
Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause for injunctive and, possibly,
monetary relief.'00
A. The Standard for Equal Protection Claims Is Broad but Possibly Danger-
ous for Municipalities and Would Allow Claimants Access to Federal
Court.
The plaintiffs in such a case will likely want a federal law violation as
one of their claims. Regardless of whether these anti-trust claims are
successful, this claim could suffice for injunctive damages' 0 ' and the
procedural effect would be critical. The codified promotion of a pre-
mium product, where other economical and similar products exist,
could be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'0 2 Michigan
courts have stated that "[e]very reasonable presumption or intend-
ment must be indulged in favor of the validity of an act, and it is only
when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable
doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court
will refuse to sustain its validity."'0o However, if an act of government
is called into question as not providing equal protection to its citizens,
that act may be submitted to a rational basis review.' 04 This test re-
quires a court only to uphold legislation if "that legislation is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose."105
This standard appears similar to the anti-trust standard stated
above, but the standard is more stringent.' The challenger of legisla-
tion for equal protection claims must show that the government's
codified action is "arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way to
",107 Ti tnthe objective of the statute. This standard is, generally, inline with
the federal standard.'s Such a claim would probably require a market
analysis of the costs of implementing LEED® standards as compared
to the available economic data of a Michigan community and viable
alternative certifications.
99. 28 U.S.C.A. §1331 (West 1980).
100. See generally Mich. Const. art. I, §2 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2010
amendments); see generally U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
101. See Rochelle Bobroff, Ex Parte Young as a Tool to Enforce Safety Net and
Civil Rights Statutes, 40 U. TOL. L. REv. 819 (2009).
102. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
103. Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Mich. 2004) (quoting Cady v.
City of Detroit, 286 N.W. 805, 807 (Mich. 1939)).
104. Id. at 184-86.
105. Id.; see Crego v. Coleman, 615 N.W.2d 218, 224 (Mich. 2000).
106. See Cooper, supra note 86,, at 1568.
107. Phillips, 685 N.W.2d at 185 (quoting Smith v. Emp't Sec. Comm., 301
N.W.2d 285, 297 (Mich. 1981)).
108. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
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As a hypothetical example, let's say LEED® certification is exclu-
sively promoted by a Michigan municipality. Also, let's assume the fi-
nal cost of that certification is $100,000.00 (with all fees and LEED@
AP costs included). Additionally, let's assume that following the
LEED@ standard would add an additional $50,000.00 to the cost of a
building project, regardless of whether the certification was actually
purchased. Let us also assume that the fictitious ACME Green Systems
offered a substantially similar certification package and standard, only
the final cost of the certification was $20,000.00 and the additional
cost to the building project by following their criteria was $10,000.00.
Private citizens may choose to go for the LEED® certification and
standard no matter what the price, but what about the relation be-
tween the two companies' price discrepancy to property values? Mich-
igan (and the country as a whole) has seen a significant drop in
property values over the past few years.o If the average value of a
property in a municipality is only $500,000.00 (again, a totally as-
sumed value), then the cost of buying that hypothetical LEED@ certi-
fication plus added project costs would be thirty percent of the overall
property value, which is a completely unconscionable figure from an
economic standpoint for a business or private individual. Conversely,
the ability to buy ACME's certification with additional project costs
would be six percent of the building cost. If we were to accept six
percent of property value as an acceptable number for a green build-
ing certification cost and LEED® was the only environmental certifi-
cation promoted by the government, then only properties at or
exceeding a value of $2.5 million would benefit from the govern-
ment's actions.
Could there be a standard more arbitrary standard? Such a standard
would only offer benefits and protection to bigger building projects
while: 1) completely ignoring a similar product that could be made
available to a diverse group of property developers and 2) completely
ignoring market forces because property values may rise or fall and
less expensive residential development may be more prevalent at a
given time than expensive retail and commercial development. In es-
sence, if the service is substantially similar, denying customers of
ACME the same advantages as a LEED@ customer would be unreason-
able, unproductive, and oppressive to a large economic class. In prac-
tice, a certain segment of society that could broker large-scale,
expensive building projects would be given more benefit from the
laws and coffers of that municipality than any other project manager
109. Harry Cassidy, Declining House Values, NEWS-HERALD (Apr. 7, 2011), http://
www.thenewsherald.com/articles/2011/04/07/business/home_improve-
ment/doc4d9dc7bc9d737518573289.txt.
Green Building Certification Systems
or property owner. This is precisely the type of action the Equal Pro-
tection Clause sets out to prevent.11o
B. Currently-out-of-State Green Building Certifications Systems Could Bring
a Claim in Federal Court on a Dormant Commerce Clause Theory If Their
Path to Doing Business in a Community Is Blocked by Another Private
Certification System.
The other troubling scenario for Michigan municipalities is the pos-
sibility that an out-of-state green building certifications system may try
to expand their business into a community that is exclusively promot-
ing one or two green building certifications systems. There are no ma-
jor cases directly on point on this issue, but the fairly recent Supreme
Court cases on municipal waste disposal of C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarks-
town, 511 U.S. 383 (1994),'" and United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007),"' give a degree
of guidance on the issue.
In the early 1990s, petitioner C&A Carbone, Inc. began operating a
waste management business in Clarkstown, New York, with the intent
of sending some of the waste to their established waste disposal sites in
other states." 3 Unfortunately for C&A Carbone, respondent Town of
Clarkstown previously made guarantees to another waste disposal
company who was allowed to build a facility that functioned as the
only authorized waste disposal distribution center in the town; anyone
else wishing to collect and distribute waste had to pay the town a fee
which subsidized the other company's distribution center."' The Su-
preme Court reasoned that requiring waste to go through the other
company's distribution center drove up the cost of doing business for
C&A Carbone, and any other out-of-state provider trying to enter the
market, because they would have to pay their competitor in order to
do business, and, therefore, discriminated against interstate com-
merce.'sJustice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found the practice
unconstitutional, and specifically noted that the main problem lay not
with the physical product being regulated but with the fact that ser-
vices offered by both in-state and out-of-state providers were being
regulated.' 1 6
In 2007, the Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation. The
Counties of Oneida and Herkimer in New York had established a simi-
110. SeeJaved Heydary, E-Commerce Protectionism and U.S. Appellate Courts, E-CoM-
MERCE TIMES (Sept. 9, 2004), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/364
72.html.
111. C8cA Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
112. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Hermiker Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330 (2007).
113. C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387-88.
114. Id. at 386-87.
115. Id. at 389.
116. Id. at 390-91.
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lar waste distribution center and required all waste to go through it;
however this center was operated by a public entity.'" 7 This time, a
group of waste collection companies sued the government entity that
ran the waste distribution center under substantially similar claims to
those laid out in Carbone."' Though the local government's activity
clearly had an effect on interstate commerce, the Court used United
Haulers to reason that this type of practice was presumptively valid be-
cause the facility and its operating body treated all in-state and out-of-
state businesses even-handedly."' The sharpest distinction between
Carbone and United Haulers, the Court reasoned, was that the facility in
United Haulers was a public facility, making Oneida County and
Herkimer County participants in the trash collection market. 120 A vig-
orous three-Justice dissent, lead by Justice Alito, saw no material dis-
tinction between this case and Carbone, and made a cogent argument
for the assertion that any direct regulation of interstate commerce will
generally be a Dormant Commerce Clause violation.1 2 '
Broadly speaking, concerns have been voiced about state environ-
mental regulations abridging interstate commerce, which could in-
clude a green building code.'2 2 A city's or a municipality's inability to
make laws that disrupt the flow of interstate commerce has never been
an absolute, but rather, a balancing approach between national eco-
nomic interests and local interests is considered under our jurispru-
dence.123 Generally, a local government's actions are not in violation
of the Commerce Clause if their actions are of a proprietary or par-
ticipatory nature; this is known as the "Market Participant Excep-
tion."'2 ' These cases, along with the current law on Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, when it comes to the interaction between
local government and private service providers, should be instructive
to Michigan municipalities and others.
Suppose the fictitious Shamrock Green Buildings, Inc. (Shamrock)
operates a green building certifications business out of South Bend,
Indiana. Shamrock has interested customers in the city of Battle
Creek, Michigan, a stone's throw over the Michigan-Indiana border.
However, let us assume that Battle Creek has required all building
projects that will be receiving city funding to obtain a LEED@ build-
ing certification. Smith Development Co. (Smith) wants to renovate a
117. United Haulers Ass'n, 550 U.S. at 334.
118. Id. at 337.
119. Id. at 342.
120. See id. at 339-40; see C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 394.
121. United Haulers Ass'n, 550 U.S. at 356-57. See C&A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390-
92.
122. Michael Burger, "It's Not Easy Being Green": Local Initiatives, Preemption
Problems, and the Market Participant, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 835, 838-40 (2010).
123. See id. at 839. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
124. Burger, supra note 124, at 839. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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historic building in downtown Battle Creek. Smith also wants to build
in compliance with Shamrock's building standards and receive their
certification, which comes with various marketing flyers, internet ads,
and even a television spot extolling how environmentally friendly the
Smith's project is. Smith would also really like $1 million in assistance
from the city because a great deal of asbestos and contaminated soil
will need to be removed for their project to move forward.
The city of Battle Creek has never heard of Shamrock and is insis-
tent that Smith obtain a LEED® certification to receive its $1 million
in assistance. Let us also assume that the total cost of Shamrock and
LEED@'s certifications is an identical $100,000.00. Smith will be left
with a few choices: (1) Smith could not get the LEED@ certification
and pay the $1 million, and then hope that the extra marketing push
of Shamrock's certification has a fantastic return on investment; (2)
Smith could pay for both LEED@ and Shamrock and spend an extra
$100,000.00, but still get $1 million from the city; or (3) Smith could
drop Shamrock, pay for LEED@, and receive an extra $1 million for
the project. Smith will probably take option 2) or 3) because Smith
needs the $1 million. If Smith does take option 2), it is likely that
Shamrock would have to lower their price in order to be competitive,
but LEED@ would not.
This is the very problem dealt with in Carbone and Untied Haulers.125
It will be untenable for Shamrock, or any other out-of-state provider,
to do business in Battle Creek because they will not be used as a certi-
fications system since a customer will likely have to pay more to use
their services. Such action by a local government actor would directly
regulate and discriminate interstate commerce because it would pick
a service provider in the stream of commerce that would receive a
benefit and it would impose a market-handicap on all other service
providers. The municipality's options to avoid this mess are simple
enough: (1) create a non-exclusive standard or (2) create a municipal
specific standard that may be influenced by private service providers,
which would fall under the Market Participant Exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
Municipalities across the country would be wise to steer clear of ex-
clusively using LEED@, or any other standard, in their assessment and
classification of green buildings. One alternative is not to reference
"Green Buildings" in any municipal code, but this seems unnecessarily
harsh and against popular sustainability attitudes. Another idea would
be to establish a non-exclusive list of green building certifications for
the municipality to rely upon when making decisions surrounding
125. See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); see United Haul-
ers Ass'n v. Oneida-Hermiker Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330
(2007).
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green buildings. This may require a state statute, but any statute
should be equipped to deal with inevitable changes in the
marketplace.
The ideal solution would be to have every municipality adopt their
own green building standard and let the consumer make a private
choice as to which certification(s) works for their building. This is not
to say that certification systems like LEED@, Green Globes@, or even
SERF@ would not be used in considering these standards. Rather, the
merits of these private standards could be considered in the creation
of a public standard, with a maximum amount of community trans-
parency and specific tailoring to the community's needs."' The city of
Detroit is in the process of approving such a system for their munici-
pal buildings.' Though their plan would reference known green
building criteria, they would also employ a Chief Sustainability Officer
to constantly assess their standard's applicability to their commu-
nity.128 It is this kind of forward-thinking, inclusive, and market-aware
approach that offers great promise from a legal and logical stand-
point. Still, the market should dictate need. With lowering property
values and a lot of older housing, cities like Lansing, Michigan, may
want to strongly embrace adaptive reuse criteria while putting less of a
premium on using other materials in new construction.12 ' Also, the
sheer cost of certain certifications may be untenable for most of the
population, especially when compared to the actual value of those
properties. so
Whatever the solution, no municipal official should be unaware as
to the possible liability their municipality may face by endorsing a pri-
vate green building certification exclusively. As the well-known legal
maxim states: ignorance of the law is no excuse. Municipalities
126. See Schindler, supra note 1, at 341-42 ("Encouraging local governments to
design their own green building regimes, which take into account their
own localities' concerns and desires, will help to achieve the regime goal of
legitimate process, resulting in greater public notice, incentive to partici-
pate, and voice.").
127. See Detroit Green Task Force Meeting Minutes, GREENINGDETROIT.COM (Nov. 30,
2011) (explaining that the Green Building Subcommittee is in the process
of reviewing the resolution), available at http://www.greeningdetroit.com/
wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Detroit-Green-Task-Force-Meeting-minutes-
November-30-201 l.pdf.
128. Proposed Resolution to Establish a High-Performance Green Building Policy of City
of Detroit Municipal Buildings, DETROIT GREEN TASK FORCE. (on file with
author).
129. CrIv OF LANSING, DESIGN LANSING: 2011 MASTER PLAN DRAr 70 (May 16,
2011) (proposing the encouragement of adaptive reuse of smaller vacant
industrial buildings as part of its master plan).
130. See Building Design & Construction Fees, GREEN BUILDING CERTIFICATION
INSTITUTE, http://www.gbci.org/main-nav/building-certification/fees/bdc.
aspx (listing fees for LEED Certification for non-members at $1,200 for re-
gistration and $4,250 for precertification, plus an added review fee) (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012).
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should not subject themselves and their citizens to costly litigation for
acting in a way that should have immediately struck them as monopo-
listic. The green building market, and related green technology fields,
represents a burgeoning new area that we do not yet fully grasp, but it
may be of critical importance to the country's economic future."'
Still, we must uniformly understand and accept that this new field is a
marketplace: a realm that should be free from government favoritism
and exclusivity.
131. See Press Release, U.S. Green Building Council, Square Footage of LEED-
Certified Existing Builds Surpasses New Construction (Dec. 7, 2011) ("A
newly issued report . .. found that efficiency financing has the potential to
soar from $20 to $150 billion annually, creating over one million jobs, mak-
ing the American economy more competitive, enhancing national security,
and helping slow the impacts of climate change.") available at http://www.
usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentlD=10712.
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